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Ackerman, Robert K. (2003, October). “Intelligence: Horizontal Integration
Challenges Intelligence Planner.” Signal, 29.
The U.S. intelligence community is in a race against international adversaries, and
to win, it must link diverse data systems and information processes so that experts
can learn enemy intentions and plans before disaster strikes. This race toward
horizontal integration of intelligence has a two-pronged thrust that encompasses
both data exchange at the collection level and information exchange at various
levels of command and civil government decision-making (Ackerman).
Agrell, Wilhelm. (2002). “When everything is intelligence – nothing is intelligence.”
Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Papers, 1(4).
Today, many intelligence analysts not only have an academic background, but
also some kind of academic education or training in their specific field. No one
thinks it is a weird thing to give courses in intelligence and it’s applications in
various fields. The limiting factor is hardly reluctance to attend courses but the
availability of appropriate and sufficiently qualified lecturers, courses, or training
programs. If a modern profession is characterized by the transformation from
improvisation and master-apprentice relations to formalized education and
training programs, then intelligence analysis has come a long way.
Aldrich, Richard J. (2003). “Intelligence Test.” Foreign Policy, 134: p. 98.
Focuses on an article by Carmen A. Medina in 'Studies in Intelligence,' which
asks whether the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) model of intelligence
analysis is failing. Argument for a revolutionary overhaul; Implications of the
growing availability of so-called open-source intelligence; Challenges to the
CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI); Response to the article by DI officer
Steven R. Ward; The slow pace of changes in U.S. intelligence.
Andre, Louis E. (1997). “Intelligence Production: Towards a Knowledge-Based
Future.” Defense Intelligence Journal, 6(2): 33-45.
To be prepared to participate in the ongoing information revolution, the
intelligence production community needs to make a "concerted effort to find
dramatically better ways to capture and distribute digitally the extraordinary and
dynamic base of knowledge resident in our analytic corps." (Abstract from
http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/D_folder/defij_analysis.html)
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Armstrong, Fulton T. (2002). “Ways to Make Analysis Relevant But Not
Prescriptive.” Studies in Intelligence, Unclassified Edition, 46(3): 37-43.
In confronting the intelligence/policy divide that analysts are expected to observe,
this author describes the conundrums that intelligence professionals face as they
attempt to provide analyses that are policy neutral yet attuned to policymaker
interests. To better navigate these choppy waters, the author finds solutions in
commitment to rigorous standards of alternative-analysis and avoidance of value
judgments while simultaneously consulting outside sources to stay in touch with
the Beltway agenda.
Barger, Deborah. (2005).“Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs.” Rand
Corporation,
Technical Report. Retrieved from
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR242.pdf
As the global war on terrorism continues to expand and the post-Cold War
security environment remains in flux, both the strengths and weaknesses of U.S.
intelligence have been thrust into the public spotlight. The author advances the
argument that a “Revolution in Intelligence Affairs” is needed to prepare the
Intelligence Community to meet its future challenges. In this report, she presents a
framework for how the United States should consider specific changes to its
intelligence enterprise to improve its effectiveness.
Barger, Deborah. (2004). “It is Time to Transform, Not Reform, U.S. Intelligence.”
SAIS Review, 24(1).
Intelligence reform has traditionally been the purview of those outside of the
Intelligence Community. Many insiders would argue that intelligence reform
efforts have resulted in more regulation and bureaucracy and little, if any,
improvement in intelligence performance. To address the challenges that the
United States will face in the future, it needs to look forward to transforming
intelligence, not backwards at reforming it. The transformation of intelligence,
however, will require a three-way partnership among external catalysts who bring
new ideas to the table, legislative overseers who support new ideas through
funding and legislation, and internal supporters who evaluate and then implement
change (Barger).
Berkowitz, Bruce. (1996). “Information Age Intelligence.” Foreign Policy, 103: p.
135.
Comments on the need to reform intelligence services in the United States. Role
of information technology advances in the need to reform intelligence services;
Areas needing changes to improve service efficiency; Urgency for the intelligence
community to assume the flexibility of corporations to changes.
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Berkowitz, Bruce D. (1997). “Information Technology and Intelligence Reform.”
Orbis, 41(1): 12-14.
Many issues of intelligence reform primarily concern technology – in particular,
information technology. The intelligence community has become more
dependent on technical systems for collecting, processing, and disseminating its
intelligence. At the same time, rapid improvements in technology are changing
both the nature of information systems and how people use them. It follows that
any intelligence reform must include plans for the effective development,
management, and organization of technology. As the U.S. intelligence
community prepares for the post-cold war era and the twenty-first century,
Americans have the opportunity to rethink what they expect from intelligence and
how they expect it to operate. The one certainty is that technology will be central
to any proposed reform, as the intelligence community, like the rest of society,
moves into the Information Age (Berkowitz).
Berkowitz, Bruce. (2001). "Better Ways to Fix Intelligence," Orbis, 45(4): 609-619.
Despite the apparent consensus on the need for change, recent intelligence failures
suggest that U.S. intelligence has yet to leave its Cold War-era methods and
structure behind. All of this raises the questions of why it has been so hard to
modernize American intelligence and what practical steps could ensure that
needed reforms finally take hold.
The challenge of intelligence reform is not how to make the intelligence
bureaucracy work better, but rather how to make the intelligence community
operate less like a bureaucracy. The measures required to achieve this bear little
resemblance to traditional intelligence reforms. Improving communications
capacity, or bandwidth, is crucial to countering the data glut intelligence analysts
face. The situation is only likely to get worse in the face of increasing interaction
among producers and users of intelligence, the sharing of ever-larger data sets,
and an expanding base of users and information sources. Communication links
will themselves become a major constraint on change within the intelligence
community. Investments in communications capacity may seem more like a
logistical detail than a major policy reform, but they are utterly essential to
improving intelligence operations (Berkowitz).
Berkowitz, Bruce. (2003). “Failing to Keep Up With the Information Revolution.”
Studies in Intelligence, 47(1).
[The author] was a Scholar-in-Residence at the Sherman Kent Center for
Intelligence Analysis, and was charged with looking at how the Directorate of
Intelligence (DI) uses information technology (IT), and how it might use this
technology more effectively.

3

DI analysts are easily a match for their counterparts elsewhere in the government
or private sector in terms of knowledge and analytic skill. [However], DI analysts
know far less about new information technology and services than do their
counterparts in the private sector and other government organizations. Many
analysts seem unaware of data that are available on the Internet and from other
non-CIA sources. Also, organizational, security, and technical obstacles keep DI
analysts from easily communicating with other agencies. Technology is no
substitute for smart analysts, of course, but better technology—and better use of
technology—could improve the DI’s efficiency and enable its analysts to be more
responsive.
Being able to redeploy analysts and form ad hoc teams quickly and effectively is
a basic requirement for intelligence organizations today. The DI needs to be more
agile, and technology is part of the solution. The DI must use information technology more effectively if it hopes to provide US officials the intelligence that
they require to detect, understand, and respond to current, emerging, and future
threats facing the United States. To meet this challenge, however, the DI must
adjust its culture and make major changes in its current approach to information
technology operations (Berkowitz).
Berkowitz, Bruce. (2004). “Intelligence for the Homeland.” SAIS Review 24(1).
Two years after the September 11th attacks on America, a significant gap remains
in our defenses against terrorists and other forms of foreign attack. The problem is
that we still lack adequate homeland intelligence. As a result, we are still ill
prepared to detect, analyze, and monitor foreign threats inside our borders (SAIS
Review).
Berkowitz, Bruce. (2004, February 1). “We Collected A Little, and Assumed a
Lot.” Washington Post, p. B01.
Last week David Kay went to Capitol Hill to explain to lawmakers what he had
found in Iraq. Until last month, Kay, a widely respected proliferation expert,
headed the Iraqi Survey Group, the team assigned after the war to find Iraq's
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons -- and assess how well U.S. intelligence
understood the threat.
"It turns out we were all wrong, probably, in my judgment," Kay said at the
hearing. "And that is most disturbing."
Disturbing is right. What happened? U.S. intelligence analysts have been taking a
lot of criticism lately, but I believe that, when all the investigations are completed,
we will discover that this wasn't an intelligence analysis failure. It was mainly an
intelligence collection failure, combined with a misunderstanding all around about
how intelligence really works.
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Berkowitz, Bruce and Allan Goodman. (2000). Best Truth: Intelligence in the
Information Age. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
One would expect the best-funded intelligence service in the world to produce
good results, but, unfortunately, the U.S. intelligence community continues to
commit avoidable blunders. Intended as a provocative manifesto, this book calls
for fundamental changes in the way that intelligence is collected, processed, and
distributed by the U.S. government. Selected case studies are presented to
illustrate problems and possible improvements. The authors call for more
openness, a less hierarchical structure, and better cooperation with the private
sector. Continually evolving technological challenges will probably be overcome
since this is what Americans do best, but it is hard to change a large bureaucracy
with an entrenched worship of secrecy, unless it receives a giant, costly shock
(e.g., the bombing of Pearl Harbor). The authors, who both started their careers at
the CIA, previously collaborated on Strategic Intelligence for American National
Security.
Best, Richard. (2003). “Intelligence Issues for Congress.” Congressional Research
Service, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, August 2003.
The U.S. Intelligence Community continues to adjust to the 21st century
environment. Congressional and executive branch initiatives have emphasized
improved cooperation among the different agencies that comprise the Community
by giving greater coordination and managerial authority to the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI). Priority continues to be placed on intelligence support to
military operations and on involvement in efforts to combat transnational threats,
especially international terrorism. Growing concerns about transnational threats
are leading to increasingly close cooperation between intelligence and law
enforcement agencies. This relationship is complicated, however, by differing
roles and missions as well as different statutory charters.
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, for which no specific warning was
provided, have led to increased emphasis on human intelligence, statutory
changes permitting closer cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence
agencies, and to consideration of organizational changes to the Intelligence
Community. Intelligence Community leadership and congressional committees
have expressed determination to enhance analytical capabilities. A major concern
is an imbalance between resources devoted to collection and those allocated to
analysis, with collected data much exceeding analytical capabilities (Best).
Best, Richard. (2005). “The Director of National Intelligence and Intelligence
Analysis.” Congressional Research Service, CRS Issue Brief for Congress,
February 2005).
The 9/11 Commission made a number of recommendations to improve the quality
of intelligence analysis. A key recommendation was the establishment of a
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Director of National Intelligence (DNI) position to manage the national
intelligence effort and serve as the principal intelligence adviser to the President
— along with a separate director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Subsequently, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,
P.L. 108-458, made the DNI the principal adviser to the President on intelligence
and made the DNI responsible for coordinating communitywide intelligence
estimates. Some observers note that separating the DNI from the analytical offices
may complicate the overall analytical effort.
Betts, Richard. (2002). “Fixing Intelligence.” Foreign Affairs, 81(1): 43-60.
A lot will be done to shore up U.S. intelligence collection and analysis. Reforms
that should have been made long ago will now go through. New ideas will get
more attention and good ones will be adopted more readily than in normal times.
There is no shortage of proposals and initiatives to shake the system up. There is,
however, a shortage of perspective on the limitations that we can expect from
improved performance. Some of the changes will substitute new problems for old
ones. The only thing worse than business as usual would be naive assumptions
about what reform can accomplish.
The intelligence community has worked much better than [critics] assume. U.S.
intelligence and associated services have generally done very well at protecting
the country. [However], even the best intelligence systems will have big failures.
It will be some time before the real story of the September 11 intelligence failure
is known. At this point it is more appropriate to focus on the merits of proposals
for reform and the larger question about what intelligence agencies can
reasonably be expected to accomplish.
Reforms that can be undertaken now will make the intelligence community a little
better. Making it much better, however, will ultimately require revising
educational norms and restoring the prestige of public service. Even if achieved,
such fundamental reform would not bear fruit until far in the future. Better
intelligence may give us several more big successes like those of the 1990s, but
even a .900 average will eventually yield another big failure. That means that
equal emphasis must go to measures for civil defense, medical readiness, and
"consequence management," in order to blunt the effects of the attacks that do
manage to get through. Efforts at prevention and preparation for their failure must
go hand in hand (Betts).
Betts, Richard K. (2004). “The New Politics of Intelligence: Will Reforms Work
This Time?” Foreign Affairs 83(3): 2-9.
The failure to prevent the attacks of September 11, 2001, the failure to find
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and the proliferation of official
investigations trying to figure out what went wrong in both cases have combined
to put intelligence issues in a very unusual position this year: at the center of a
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closely contested presidential campaign. All the attention creates both an
opportunity and a danger. The opportunity stems from the consensus that major
reforms are necessary. The danger stems from the gap between the urge to do
something and the uncertainty about just what that something should be – as well
as from the entanglement of intelligence and policy issues involved with the Iraq
question in particular.
At the end of the day, the strongest defense against intelligence mistakes will
come less from any structural or procedural tweak than from the good sense, good
character, and good mental habits of senior government officials (Betts).
Bodnar, John W. (2003). Warning Analysis for the Information Age: Rethinking the
Intelligence Process. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College,
Center for Strategic Intelligence Research.
Changes in technology in the past half century have destroyed the ability to
provide warning intelligence by traditional means. The changing tempo of the
WMD and terrorist threats has virtually destroyed the ability to provide tactical or
strategic warning.
New methodologies for warning intelligence can be developed based on quantum
thinking rather than Newtonian thinking. Revolutions in Military Affairs (RMAs)
are precipitated by new developments in technology that ultimately change not
only strategies and operations but organizations as well. Our current strategies and
organizations are based on Industrial Age technologies built by Newtonian
thinking. Strategies and organizations for the Information Age must be built on
quantum thinking.
This analysis also points toward the basis of a New Science based on quantum
methods, which assume that the world is digital and multi-state. Data can be
"massive" both in quantity and type. A major problem in exploiting the massive
quantities available to the Intelligence Community is the lack of a historical
baseline and a lack of librarians and curators to organize and tag the data for easy
retrieval. This means that we must develop methods for rapid writing of classified
history and for systematic data archiving. Collecting and analyzing massive
amounts of data will not provide valid assessments unless the dimensionality of
the data reflects the dimensionality of the problem. We need to analyze changes
required in organizational structures to go from Industrial Age organizations for
the Cold War to Information Age organizations needed to combat WMD and
terrorism proliferation networks (Bodnar).
Callum, Robert. (2001). “The Case for Cultural Diversity in the Intelligence
Community.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,
14(1): 25-48.
Historically, the U.S. Intelligence Community has been a homogeneous
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environment bereft of participation from different races and cultures. While the IC
has made strides in recent years, the community is still overwhelmingly white and
disproportionately male. This cultural homogeneity leads to predictable and
preventable errors in analysis. These errors commonly fall under the rubric of
``mirror-imaging’’: the fallacy that antagonists will think and act as ``we’’ would
if ``we’’ were in their shoes. Arguably, greater diversity will lead to
improvements in analysis by lessening the impact of shared, common biases. An
analogy comes from the world of business, which has become increasingly
diverse in response to the inherent unpredictability of international markets.
Clark, Richard M. (2003). Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach.
Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
Designed to give analysts and practitioners state-of-the-art, practical information
and skills, Intelligence Analysis guides readers through the art of target modeling
and organizational analysis, as well as quantitative and predictive techniques.
Intelligence collectors, consumers, and analysts can and should work together to
create and share a conceptual model of the intelligence target. Simply put, it's a
smarter, more sensible way to collect, synthesize, and utilize intelligence. The
author makes extensive use of real-world examples and cases and employs nearly
100 graphic elements to illustrate the versatility and effectiveness of his
methodology.
Coffman, Thayne, Seth Greenblatt, and Sherry Marcus. (2004). “Graph-based
Technologies for Intelligence Analyst.” Communications of the ACM, 47(3):
45-47.
For the past 20 years, the intelligence community’s focus was on improving
intelligence collection at the cost of improving intelligence analysis. The problem
today is often not a lack of information, but instead, information overload.
Analysts lack tools to locate the relatively few bits of relevant information and
tools to support reasoning over that information.
Subgraph isomorphism and statistical classification via social network analysis
(SNA) metrics are two important classes of techniques that operate on attributed
relational graphs, a representation familiar to the intelligence problems: finding
significant combinations of events in a deluge of information (Coffman,
Greenblatt, and Marcus).
Dalby, Simon. (1995). “Security, Intelligence, the National Interest and the Global
Environment.” Intelligence and National Security, 10(3): 175-197.
The global environmental situation is obviously a matter of concern.
Stratospheric ozone holes, global climate change, sea level changes, fish stock
depletions, desertification, population change, deforestation, and many other
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issues clearly affect the national interests of many states. This important cluster
of issues is now often described under the rubric of ‘environmental security’.
In exploring this dilemma of environmental security, this essay first surveys some
of the large scale contemporary environmental challenges. It then discusses the
effects of environmental changes on international security. It suggests that the
Cold War assumptions are inappropriate to dealing with most environmental
security issues. The implications of rethinking security, including an expansive
definition of the national interest and the global necessities of politics in a
changing environment, are explored in later sections. The conclusion offers some
tentative suggestions for reformulating post-Cold War security agencies’
mandates and practices.
Davis, Jack. (1991). “Combating Mind-Set: Improving the Quality of Analysis.”
Studies in Intelligence (Unclassified Edition), 35(5).
When intelligence analysts cannot rely solely on factual evidence to address
questions of concern to U.S. national security, they have to begin to employ
judgment. In effect, when we do not know, we estimate. And when analysts
estimate they depend on mind-set. For the purpose of this article, mind-set is the
distillation of the intelligence analyst’s cumulative factual and conceptual
knowledge into a framework for making estimative judgments on a complex
subject. Case studies on Agency analytic performance indicate that analysts and
managers alike do not pay their dues to this powerful phenomenon. Analytic
procedures and practices, herein called tradecraft, that do not ensure against or
otherwise combat mind-set put the resultant assessments at high risk of either
being wrong or being unread.
Davis, Jack. (1995). “A Policymaker’s Perspective on Intelligence Analysis.”
Studies in Intelligence (Unclassified Edition), 38(5).
This article is based on the author's interviews during 1991-93 of Ambassador
Robert D. Blackwill. The original pillar of Ambassador Blackwill's doctrinal
views on intelligence and policy was self-interest--his effort to make the
relationship work for him personally under trying conditions. He served as
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European and Soviet
Affairs, National Security Council Staff, during 1989-90, a tumultuous period that
witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reshaping of Europe. The more
lasting pillar is his concern for the national interest--a belief that the United States
can ill afford prevailing patterns of ineffective ties between experts on events
overseas and policymakers in Washington.
Davis, Jack. (2002). “Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning.”
Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Papers, 1(1).
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A host of reports have been written over the 50 years of CIA history evaluating
analytic performance and recommending changes in priorities and tradecraft.
These “post-mortem reports” have been issued by Agency leaders and
components as well as by Congressional committees and commissions and nongovernmental organizations concerned about intelligence performance. Starting
with the 1990s, post-mortem reports increased in number, generated both by
charges of specific intelligence failures and by general recognition that the postCold War period presented new challenges to intelligence.
The recent post-mortem reports have helped Directorate of Intelligence leaders to
examine current doctrine and practice critically, and to address identified
challenges in training programs. This Occasional Paper is one of a series of
assessments of what recent critiques have said about the key challenges facing the
DI in the new century.
The present paper addresses the challenges of strategic warning. It reviews five
post-mortem critiques: (1) Douglas J. MacEachin, “Tradecraft of Analysis,” U.S.
Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform (1995); (2) Adm. David
Jeremiah (R), Intelligence Community’s Performance on the Indian Nuclear Tests
(1998); (3) CIA, Office of Inspector General, Alternative Analysis in the
Directorate of Intelligence (1999); (4) Report of the Commission to Assess the
Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (1998); (5) Working Group on
Intelligence Reform of the National Strategy Information Center, The Future of
US Intelligence (1996).
Davis, Jack. (2002). “Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Analysis and the
Policymaking Process.” Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis,
Occasional Papers, 1(2).
The recent post-mortem reports have helped Directorate of Intelligence leaders to
examine current doctrine and practice critically, and to address identified
challenges in training programs. This Occasional Paper is one of a series of
assessments of what recent critiques have said about the key challenges facing the
DI in the new century.
The present paper addresses the challenge of establishing effective analystpolicymaker relations. It reviews five post-mortem critiques: (1) Twentieth
Century Fund Task Force on the Future of Intelligence, In from the Cold (1996);
(2) Independent Task Force of the Council on Foreign Relations, Making
Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence (1996); (3) Commission on
the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community,
Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence (1996); (4)
Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United
States (1998); (5) Working Group on Intelligence Reform of the National Strategy
Information Center, The Future of US Intelligence (1996).
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Davis, Jack. (2002). “Improving CIA Analytic Performance: DI Analytic
Priorities.” Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional
Papers, 1(3).
The recent post-mortem reports have helped Directorate of Intelligence leaders to
examine current doctrine and practice critically, and to address identified
challenges in training programs. This Occasional Paper is one of a series of
assessments of what recent critiques have said about the key challenges facing the
DI in the new century.
The present paper addresses the challenge of establishing priorities among
competing uses of analytic resources (for example, current trend reporting vs.
customized “action” analysis vs. in-depth studies). It reviews six post-mortem
critiques: (1) Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Future of Intelligence, In
from the Cold (1996); (2) Adm. David Jeremiah (R), Intelligence Community’s
Performance on the Indian Nuclear Tests (1998); (3) Report of the Commission to
Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (1998); (4) Independent
Task force of the Council on Foreign Relations, Making Intelligence Smarter:
The Future of U.S. Intelligence (1996); (5) Commission on the Roles and
Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Preparing for the 21st
Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence (1996); (6) Staff Study, Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, IC21: Intelligence
Community in the 21st Century (1996).
Davis, Jack. (2003). “If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis?” Sherman
Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Papers, 2(1).
Strategic warning, to be effective, has to be credible in assessing contingent
dangers and has to facilitate policymaker decision and action to protect against
these dangers. This paper tables for consideration and debate several
recommendations to advance two goals: To reconstitute strategic warning as a
collaborative governmental function by engaging policy officials responsible for
effecting defensive measures in every step of the analysis process, including topic
selection and trend monitoring, and to warrant a distinctive intelligence
contribution to a collaborative warning effort by expanding dedicated analytic
resources and sharpening requisite substantive expertise and specialized
tradecraft.
Davis, Jack. (2003). “Tensions in Analyst-Policymaker Relations: Opinions, Facts,
and Evidence.” Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional
Papers, 2(2).
This paper has argued that policymaker criticism of DI analysis on hot-button
issues is not an exceptional challenge but a largely normal clash of conflicting
professional priorities between analysts and policymakers as two distinct national
security tribes. Below is an attempt to provide general tradecraft guidance for
analysts based mainly on personal experience and research. Because contentious
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issues usually generate an expansion in requests for analytic deliverables and a
compression of deadlines, managers are advised to invest in incremental
development of identified analyst skills before sustained policymaker criticism
strikes.
The general message of these recommendations is that analysts should take the
tradecraft elements of policymaker criticism seriously. Analysts should enhance,
first, understanding of the dynamics of national security policy making, second,
their vulnerability to misperception and, third, their skills in remedial practices.
The goal—by raising standards of practice—is to take tradecraft issues off the
table, so to speak, in an effort to isolate and defuse any politically motivated
elements.
Dempsey, Michael P. and William C. Prillaman. (2004). “Mything the Point: What's
Wrong with the Conventional Wisdom about the C.I.A.” Intelligence and
National Security 19(1): 1-28.
This article examines seven myths about the Central Intelligence Agency. These
misperceptions persist because of an inadequate understanding of the relationship
between intelligence and policy, outdated stereotypes that ignore recent reforms,
and the politics that accompany delivering bad news to senior officials. Scholars
and intelligence officers looking to advance the debate on intelligence issues
could usefully focus their research on several core dynamics: sharpening the
distinction between intelligence failures and policy failures; deconstructing
intelligence successes to determine whether those 'best practices' can be replicated
elsewhere; and monitoring the risks when an apolitical intelligence agency closely
interacts with the policy community.
DeRosa, Mary. (2004). Data Mining and Data Analysis for Counterterrorism.
Washington, DC: CSIS Press.
Defeating terrorism requires a more nimble intelligence apparatus that operates
more actively within the United States and makes use of advanced information
technology. Data-mining and automated data-analysis techniques are powerful
tools for intelligence and law enforcement officials fighting terrorism. But these
tools also generate controversy and concern. They make analysis of data –
including private data – easier and more powerful. This can make private data
more useful and attractive to the government. Data-mining and data-analysis are
simply too valuable to prohibit, but they should not be embraced without
guidelines and controls for their use. Policymakers must acquire an
understanding of data-mining and automated data-analysis tools so that they can
craft policy that encourages responsible use and sets parameters for that use.
This report builds on a series of roundtable discussions held by CSIS. It provides
a basic description of how data-mining techniques work, how they can be used for
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counterterrorism, and their privacy implications. It also identifies where informed
policy development is necessary to address privacy and other issues (DeRosa).
Deutch, John and Jeffrey Smith. (2002). “Smarter Intelligence.” Foreign Policy,
128: 64-70.
Many proposals have been put forward to improve U.S. intelligence capabilities.
Decisions on intelligence reform will revolve around this question of the proper
balance between national security and law enforcement goals. Meanwhile,
historical boundaries between organizations remain, stymieing the collection of
timely intelligence and warnings of terrorist activity. This fragmented approach to
intelligence gathering makes it quite possible that information collected by one
U.S. government agency before an overt act of terrorism will not be shared and
synthesized in time to avert it.
A larger question underlying discussions of intelligence reform is, how much
should Americans expect from the intelligence community? While the American
people can be better protected, they should be under no illusion that the
intelligence community can remove all risk… Fortunately, there are not hundreds
of [terrorist] organizations but perhaps only a few dozen, which makes the
intelligence task feasible. But it is unreasonable to expect 100 percent success.
Thus, while intelligence is the first line of defense, other counterterrorism efforts
are also important, including prevention by deterrence or interdiction, bioweapons
defense, and managing the consequences of a catastrophic terrorist attack
whenever and wherever it occurs (Deutch and Smith).
Doran, Charles F. “Why Forecasts Fail: The Limits and Potential of Forecasting in
International Relations and Economics.” International Studies Review, 1(2):
11-42.
A forecast is a prediction based on knowledge of past behavior. The forecaster
must consider to what extent past trends will continue in the future. In linear
forecasts, the past is prologue, and forecasting amounts to linear extrapolation of
the past trend into the future. When conditions are propitious and behavior over
time is approximately linear, the linear forecast will fit the data tolerably well. But
forecasts ultimately fail because no technique has been developed that allows the
forecaster to predict, prior to the event itself, when a nonlinearity will occur. This
essay argues that a nonlinearity is a critical point at which expectations
(predictions) induced by the prior trend suddenly confront a profound alteration in
that trend, indeed, an abrupt inversion. A nonlinearity is a total break from the
past trend, a discontinuity. The theory of relative power (systemic structure)
dynamics known as power cycle theory provides both a thorough, graphic
explanation of this discontinuity in expectations that occurs at critical points in the
process, and the reason why nonlinearities are impossible to derive from prior
trends. Theoretical and empirical assessment of a process and its dynamics makes
possible an explanation of the conditions that give rise to such nonlinearity.
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Hence such dynamical analysis can predict that such a nonlinearity will occur, but
in all but a closed system it still cannot predict when the nonlinearity will occur.
Dupont, Alan. (2003). “Intelligence for the Twentieth-First Century.” Intelligence
and National Security, 18(4): 15-39.
The transformation of intelligence architectures, particularly in the West, is no
less profound than that of the weapons, platforms, warfighting systems and
governments they are designed to support and inform. Moreover, the cumulative
weight of the changes in prospect will redefine the way in which intelligence is
used and conceived. The old demarcation lines between strategic and operational
intelligence and between operations and intelligence, once starkly differentiated
will blur. Decision-makers will have better access to intelligence as a result of
advances in 'pull' technology, which have made possible intelligence on demand
while open source intelligence will enrich and add value to national intelligence
databases.
Although information will become more plentiful and less of a privileged source
in the global information environment of the twenty-first century, paradoxically
the demand for timely, high quality strategic and operational intelligence will
intensify rather than diminish. What will distinguish the successful practitioners
of twenty-first century intelligence is the ability to fuse and integrate all elements
of the process to provide seamless support for policy-makers and operational
commanders. However, despite impressive advances in integration, technical
collection and communications no intelligence system, no matter how efficacious,
will ever be able to completely dispel the fog of war.
Fishbein, Warren and Gregory Treverton. (2004). “Making Sense of Transnational
Threats.” Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Papers,
3(1).
Co-authored by Warren Fishbein of the Kent Center’s Global Futures Partnership
and Gregory Treverton of the RAND Corporation, the paper proposes some
practical ideas for adapting the organizational culture and processes in which
analysis of these issues is done to improve understanding and warning.
The authors use as a springboard for their discussion the ideas generated by a
series of unclassified, multidisciplinary workshops with outside experts convened
by GFP and RAND during 2003 to explore “Developing Alternative Analysis for
Transnational Issues.” (Reports of these workshops are published separately by
RAND Corporation in report CF-200.) In this paper, workshop insights are
coupled with findings from further research on concepts such as intuitive
thinking, sense-making, and mindfulness to suggest an approach for applying
what the authors call “alternative sense-making” to complex transnational issues.
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The ideas suggested here, however, are less a prescription for analytical practice
than an invitation to dialogue, debate, and further research that will help advance
the doctrine of analysis for transnational threats.
Fulghum, David A. (2001). “Intelligence Analysis Shifts Closer to Combat.”
Aviation Week & Space Technology, 154(25): p. 179.
Reports on the shift of military intelligence closer to combat, with knowledge of
friend and foe more important than weapons. Initiative of the United States Air
Force in Europe; Deployable Ground Station Four; Distributed Common Ground
System; Changes in the processing, exploitation and distribution of intelligence
products.
Garst, Ronald and Max Gross. (1997). “On Becoming an Intelligence Analyst.”
Defense Intelligence Journal, 6(2): 47-59.
The authors seek to describe the "set of talents, skills and personal characteristics
required of the successful all-source intelligence analyst." (Abstract from
http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/D_folder/defij_analysis.html.)
Gentry, John A. (1995). “Intelligence Analyst/Manager Relations at the CIA.”
Intelligence and National Security, 10(3): 133-146.
The day-to-day, seemingly mundane interactions between analysts and their
supervisors have major influences on the ultimate quality and usefulness of the
analysis that intelligence agencies provide to their policymaking consumers.
These influences can have positive or negative effects, but they become
enduringly pernicious when poor analyst/manager relationships are systematized
into a dysfunctional ‘culture’. The mechanics and significance of these
relationships have received scant attention from academics and public policy
commentators. The aim here is to describe and assess the relationship between
analysts and their managers in the United States Central Intelligence Agency’s
Directorate of Intelligence (DI) in the 1980s and early 1990s. The CIA’s culture
changed markedly in this period from that of previous decades.
Gentry, John A. (1993). Lost Promise: How CIA Analysis Misserves the Nation.
Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Lost Promise describes and critiques the Directorate of Intelligence of the Central
Intelligence Agency-the analytical arm of the agency. Gentry first describes the
DI's historical and avowed mission, and in so doing, he sets a standard for
comparison with the troubled operations of the DI since the early 1980s. He
proposes an 18-point reform program and helps to lift the fog that surrounds the
CIA and which protects it from serious external evaluation. Gentry corrects
misunderstandings about CIA analysis and explains how analysis can become
biased or "politicized."
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George, Roger Z. (2004). “Fixing the Problem of Analytical Mind-Sets: Alternative
Analysis.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,
17(3): 385-404.
“Mind-sets” can pose a fatal trap in [the intelligence] process: history is full of
examples in which commanders have erred because they held to an inaccurate
picture of the other’s value, or their goals, intentions, or capabilities. A simple
definition of a mind-set might be a series of expectations through which a human
being sees the world. Over time, the strategist and intelligence analyst develop
these expectations, based on how past events have occurred; each will draw
general conclusions about the relationships among important international
phenomena, about how states typically behave (e.g., maximizing power vis-à-vis
others), or about foreign leaders’ motivations. As new events occur, data
consistent with earlier patterns of beliefs are more likely to be accepted as valid,
while data that conflicts with an analyst’s expectations is discounted or set aside.
It is human nature, according to many psychological studies, for individuals to
“perceive what they expect to perceive,” and holding such mind-sets is virtually
unavoidable. The more expert one becomes, the more firm become one’s set of
expectations about the world. While these mind-sets can be very helpful in sorting
through incoming data, they become an Achilles heel to a professional strategist
or intelligence analyst when they become out of date because of new international
dynamics. Knowing when a mind-set is becoming obsolete and in need of
revision can test the mettle of the best expert.
This challenge has no perfect or permanent solutions. But the past decade has
brought a greater recognition that the application of rigorous analytic techniques
can help significantly in averting the likelihood of surprise by uncovering
analytical mind-sets and sensitizing policymakers to the inherent uncertainty
surrounding major international developments that they confront each day. U.S.
strategists would do well to understand these advances in analytical tradecraft, in
order to encourage the Intelligence Community to better exploit them and to
guard against susceptibility to distorted or inaccurate views of the world.
Gill, Peter. (2004). “Securing the Globe: Intelligence and the Post-9/11 Shift from
'Liddism' to 'Drainism’.” Intelligence and National Security, 19(3).
Significant shifts have been underway in security intelligence agencies and
processes since the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States. Whereas the
previous quarter of a century had seen a considerable democratization of
intelligence, the article examines whether UK and US government responses risk
the re-creation of 'security states'. Changes since 9/11 in law, doctrine, the
intelligence process - targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and action and oversight are considered and it is concluded that there is a danger of the
rebirth of independent security states.
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Goldman, David and Taylor, Stan A. (2004). “Intelligence Reform: Will More
Agencies, Money, and Personnel Help?” Intelligence and National Security,
19(3): 416-435.
The contemporary political climate is virtually demanding significant intelligence
reforms based on what are seen as poor performances in recent crises. Many of
these demands will ask for new agencies, more money, and more personnel. Such
actions could well worsen the US intelligence process rather than strengthen it.
However, now is a propitious time to make certain internal reforms and to find a
way for the Intelligence Community to be truly integrated.
Gourley, Robert. (1997). “Intuitive Intelligence.” Defense Intelligence Journal, 5(2):
61-75.
In times of crisis, analysts "are expected to do what they have been taught their
whole career to avoid; they must make rapid assessments of enemy intentions and
well developed projections based on intuition." The author makes some
suggestions on how analysts might be better prepared to respond to requirements
for instantaneous assessments. (Abstract from
http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/D_folder/defij_analysis.html.)
Grabo, Cynthia M. (2004). Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Anticipating Surprise, originally written as a manual for training intelligence
analysts during the Cold War, has been declassified and condensed to provide
wider audiences with an inside look at intelligence gathering and analysis for
strategic warning. Cynthia Grabo defines the essential steps in the warning
process, examines distinctive ingredients of the analytic method of intelligence
gathering, and discusses the guidelines for assessing the meaning of gathered
information. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on America,
intelligence collection and analysis has been hotly debated. In this book, Grabo
suggests ways of improving warning assessments that better convey warnings to
policymakers and military commanders who are responsible for taking
appropriate action to avert disaster.
Grau, Lester W. (2004). “Something Old, Something New: Guerillas, Terrorists,
and Intelligence Analysis.” Military Review, 84(4): 42-49.
Focuses on the importance of U.S. military intelligence to counter guerrilla
warfare and terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. Background on the guerilla
warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq being countered by the U.S. Armed Forces; Tools
in counterinsurgency that can provide data to a military intelligence analyst;
Police technique that combines spatial analysis and psychological behavior
patterns of criminals; Role of translators and interrogators in human military
intelligence.
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Grundmann, William R. (1997). “Reshaping the Intelligence Production
Landscape.” Defense Intelligence Journal, 6(2): 23-33.
The "viability of the Intelligence Community will depend on the seamless
integration of the separate intelligence organizations and the functional elements
within those organizations." One problem area is that "[w]e are, increasingly,
upping the pace of current intelligence production and allotting the commensurate
level of analytic manpower to meet the requirements of continuous contingencies
and crises. At the same time, we have incurred significant reductions in analytic
resources as a result of funding cuts over the last five years." (Abstract from
http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/D_folder/defij_analysis.html.)
Haass, Richard. (1996). Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S.
Intelligence. New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations.
The U.S. Intelligence Community faces major challenges, including a widespread
lack of confidence in its ability to carry out its mission competently and legally.
One consequence of this perception is that reform of intelligence policy and
capabilities will not be left up to the intelligence community itself. Other parts of
the executive branch and Congress will certainly be involved. It is no less true,
however, that the intelligence community has been adjusting to the changed
demands of the post-Cold War world for several years and, for the most part,
appears to be providing reliable and useful information to its customers.
Additional reform is necessary, but should not create more problems than it solves
and, in so doing, weaken a critical tool of U.S. national security.
The recommendations of this Task Force fall under three headings: measures to
improve the intelligence product, suggestions for internal reorganization, and
steps to build or rebuild relationships with important external constituencies.
Hansen, Brian. (2002). “Intelligence Reforms.” CQ Researcher, 12:3.
Intelligence officials were warned in 1995 that terrorists were plotting to hijack
airliners and crash them into landmark buildings in the United States. Yet, the
horrific events that unfolded on Sept. 11 took the CIA, the FBI and the rest of the
U.S. intelligence community by surprise. Some experts call the attacks the worst
intelligence failure in American history, while others maintain that the nation's
spy agencies had no way of detecting or preventing the multi-pronged,
international conspiracy. This much is certain: The attacks have prompted
lawmakers to impose major changes on the nation's intelligence-gathering
agencies. But the rush to overhaul the intelligence apparatus troubles some
experts, who fear the changes will be ineffective. Others say the reforms have
breached the traditional wall between criminal investigations and intelligence
gathering, potentially curtailing citizens' civil liberties.
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Harris, Shane. (2003). “Beautiful Minds.” Government Executive, 35(13): 21-34.
Two years after the Sept. 11 attacks, U.S. intelligence agencies still rely on
practices that thwart or water down insightful analysis, critics say. Congressional
reports and inquiries into lapses in intelligence have criticized the agencies as
vast, befuddled bureaucracies. Most critiques of the CIA and a dozen other
intelligence agencies have said they must become more "modern" organizations,
better equipped to fight terrorists. But when any organization truly changes, it is
usually from within and not according to the prescriptions of critics.
Because that is so, intelligence analysts, especially the most creative ones, offer
the best hope that American spy agencies will find ways to better understand and
prevent terrorism. Fixated for the past half-century on the Soviet Union and its
vast, lumbering bureaucracy, most analysts only recently have had to think like
the nimble, shadowy terrorists they now face. But insightful analysis hasn't been
widely embraced. The intelligence community sometimes is stifled by a
compulsion to speak with one voice. The customers of intelligence agencies
elected officials and senior leaders in federal agencies want harmony, not
dissonance. Often, only the least conventional thinkers can tune out the noise and
find the true notes (Harris).
Hedley, John Hollister. (2005). “Learning from Intelligence Failures.”
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 18(3): 435-450.
The Russians have a host of sayings, and one that seems pertinent goes like this:
“If you see a Bulgarian on the street, beat him up. He will know why.” Given the
enormously tragic events of 11 September 2001, and the dismaying absence of
weapons of mass destruction in post-invasion Iraq, any Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) officer seen on the street in Langley, Virginia, could be pummeled
and would likely be someone who would know why. For nearly four years it has
been hard to go wrong by criticizing the Agency.
But putting this pummeling—verbal pummeling, thankfully—into perspective is
possible and desirable. It is part and parcel of the “intelligence school of hard
knocks.” It can be put into perspective with four simple observations:
* Allegations of intelligence failure are inevitable.
* This is true in large part because, in intelligence, failures are inevitable.
* Intelligence organizations do learn (as well as suffer) from the allegations and the
failures.
* Even though it is impossible to learn once and for all how to prevent the
recurrence of something inevitable, the ratio of success to failure probably can be
improved.
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Heuer, Jr., Richards J. (2004). “Limits of Intelligence Analysis.” Orbis 49(1): 75-94.
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) Report on the U.S.
Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, dated July 7,
2004, provides a remarkably detailed account of information available to the
intelligence community prior to the war in Iraq and how it was analyzed. The
general impression it gives is one of unconscionable failure, due to the
intelligence community's very poor analysis of the information. Unfortunately, the
magnitude and breadth of the Committee's criticism shows a serious lack of
understanding of the problems intelligence analysts face when making judgments
based on incomplete, ambiguous, and potentially deceptive information.
This article applies insights from the psychology of intelligence analysis to help
explain what went wrong and why. It also discusses broader questions not
addressed in the SSCI report: What can we reasonably expect from intelligence
analysis? And what methods and procedures are available to improve intelligence
analysis?
Heuer, Jr., Richards J. (1999). The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
How do you beat cognitive biases? How do you set aside preconceived mind-sets
and mental models? The author emphasizes the importance of not only analyzing
the substance of intelligence problems, but also of understanding the analytic
thought processes. He maintains that thinking analytically is a skill like carpentry
or driving a car -- it can be taught, it can be learned, and it can be improved with
practice. Heuer examines cognitive biases -- subconscious pre-conceptions that
impair objectivity and skew analysis in such areas as evaluation of evidence,
recognition of signs of change, perception of cause and effect, and estimation of
future probabilities. Heuer offers techniques for confronting such biases and
diluting their impact. This book is written in a clear, crisp, concise, jargon-free
mode that is readily understandable. It is of value not only to other intelligence
professionals -- that is, to managers, trainers, collectors, and technicians but also
to anyone that has to analyze or make judgments, decisions, and predictions about
problems and choices that arise in the course of day-to-day life.
Hillsman, Roger. (1995). “Does the CIA Still Have a Role?” Foreign Affairs, 74(5):
104-117.
The history of intelligence since World War I shows no dividends resembling the
miracles of spy-thriller fiction. The benefits gained by fielding a worldwide team
of secret agents are not worth the exorbitant cost. Spies sometimes provide useful
information on weapons development and other long-term threats; usually their
information is outdated or irrelevant. The CIA should stick to its strengths:
analysis for policymakers and high-tech surveillance. Cloak-and-dagger foreign
policy tempts presidents into shirking the hard work of diplomacy and politics.
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The practice has blackened America’s reputation and subverted its democracy
(Foreign Affairs Abstract).
Hollywood, John, Diane Snyder, Kenneth N. McKay, and John E. Boon. (2004).
Out of the Ordinary: Finding Hidden Threats by Analyzing Unusual Behavior.
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
Presents a unique approach to selecting and assembling disparate pieces of
information to produce a general understanding of a threat. The Atypical Signal
Analysis and Processing schema identifies atypical behavior potentially related to
terror activity; puts it into context; generates and tests hypotheses; and focuses
analysts’ attention on the most significant findings. A supporting conceptual
architecture and specific techniques for identifying and analyzing out-of-theordinary information are also described.
Hulnick, Arthur S. (1999). Fixing the Spy Machine: Preparing American Intelligence
for the Twenty-First Century. Westport, CT: Praeger.
With the end of the Cold War and the dawning of a new century, the U.S.
intelligence system faces new challenges and threats. The system has suffered
from penetration by foreign agents, cutbacks in resources, serious errors in
judgment, and what appears to be bad management; nonetheless, it remains one of
the key elements of America's strategic defense. Hulnick suggests that things are
not as bad as they seem, that America's intelligence system is reasonably well
prepared to deal with the many threats to national security. He examines the
various functions of intelligence from intelligence gathering and espionage to the
arcane fields of analysis, spy-catching, secret operations, and even the business of
corporate espionage (Synopsis from amazon.com).
Hulnick, Arthur S. (2002). “The Downside to Open Source Intelligence.”
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 15(4): 565-579.
Intelligence analysts, whether in government or the private sector, agree that open
source data is the bread and butter of analysis, forming the great bulk of the
material with which they must work. Open sources also provide the collateral
material that informs and helps drive the intelligence collection process. No good
case officers or intercept technicians can make sense out of what they learn
without comprehensive knowledge of the world that surrounds their human or
electronic sources. The argument for expanding the use of open source
intelligence (OSINT) is made compellingly by Robert David Steele. Yet, some
negative aspects of OSINT deserve attention.
Hulnick, Arthur S. (2004). Keeping Us Safe: Secret Intelligence and Homeland
Security. Westport, CT: Praeger.
How can the United States guard against a clever unknown enemy while still
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preserving the freedoms it holds dear? Hulnick explains the need to revamp U.S.
intelligence operations from a system focused on a single Cold War enemy to one
offering more flexibility in combating non-state actors (including terrorists, spies,
and criminals) like those responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Offering possible solutions not to be found in the federal commission's official
report, Hulnick's groundbreaking work examines what is really necessary to make
intelligence and homeland security more efficient and competent, both within the
United States and abroad.
Ignatius, David. (2005, April 15). “Can the Spy Agencies Dig Out.” The Washington
Post, p. A25.
The uncertainty within the intelligence community was evident at a conference
last week at Harvard, where 100 or so spooks gathered with a few academics and
journalists to discuss ways to restructure intelligence for the 21st century. I wish
[John Negroponte] had been there to hear some of the ideas, and also to get a
sense of just how disoriented intelligence professionals are these days.
To correct this deficiency, the IC must refocus its management and organizational
structure around substantive national security missions rather than collection He's
walking into a world where people aren't sure which end is up.
It's time for Negroponte to start rebuilding, but how? The new structure he will
oversee as director of national intelligence is the biggest mystery of all. Will his
organization be the new center for intelligence analysis? If so, what will happen to
the many hundreds of folks who work at the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence?
Will the DNI's new National Counterterrorism Center be the focal point for antiterrorism operations, effectively superseding the authority of the CIA's
Directorate of Operations? Nobody seems to know the answers to these big
questions, which is worrisome.
So here's a modest suggestion for Negroponte: When it comes to intelligence
reform, less is more. We need fewer, smarter people who are empowered to take
risks and make bold judgments. We don't need a proliferation of new,
inexperienced intelligence officers overseas who will fill quotas by recruiting
bogus agents who produce large volumes of low-quality intelligence. We need
real spies, not "measurable metrics."
Intelligence and Analysis on Iraq: Issues for the Intelligence Community. (29 July
2004). Kerr Group Reports.
A series of three reports analyzing the intelligence process before the war,
describing factors affecting the drafting of the NIE, and identifying systemic
factors that channeled analysts’ evaluations and analyses. Identifies failures of
collection, uncritical analytic assumptions, and inadequate management reviews.
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“Intelligence Gathering: Evaluating Sources for Objective Analysis.” (2000).
Online, 24(1): 47-50.
There is little doubt that the information revolution has changed the way we all do
business. Intelligence analysis is no exception. More information is now available
to the analyst than ever before. However, more information is not necessarily
synonymous with better information. To intelligence consumers, the product is
only as credible as the sources from which it comes. And this basic concept that
"intelligence must be based on credible objective information" is the exact reason
why it is important to evaluate sources for intelligence analysis.
This article will define both national and business intelligence, enumerate several
factors of evaluation, consider some sources, identify some places which provide
evaluations, and conclude with some ideas for further consideration. Also note
that this article only considers open sources which are available for all to use. It
will not delve into the secret, human, or technical means of collecting information
(Online).
“Intelligence Incorporated.” (2005). Government Executive, 37(8): 40-46.
Eurasia Group, a privately held firm based in Manhattan, looks and acts the way
U.S. intelligence agencies might have to if they're going to implement the
sweeping reforms that lawmakers and administration officials promise are in
store. Some intelligence agencies already rely on Eurasia, and other private shops
like it, to make sense of publicly available information and to gain expertise they
lack in-house. But intelligence reformers insist the agencies must seek out such
experts more frequently to fill gaps in the information that spies can provide.
Proponents of outside analysis argue that the government doesn't always need
classified information to understand the direction of the world. Open source
information often is well documented, and because it has been disseminated
widely, a broader range of experts who might discover details that others miss can
review it. Of course, it's also collectible by just about anyone with an Internet
connection or a library card. And this contradicts the ethos of much of U.S.
intelligence: The best information is the hardest to get and it must be jealously
guarded. Because information is power, the more things the government knows
that others don't, the stronger the government.
Johnson, Loch K. (1996). "Analysis for a New Age." Intelligence and National
Security, 11(4): 657-671.
Working from his base on the staff of the Commission on the Roles and
Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community (the "Aspin-Brown
Commission"), Johnson reviews the state of U.S. intelligence analysis and offers
his thoughts on how it might be made better. He argues that intelligence analysis
must be "consumer-driven"; that is, analysts "must design the intelligence product
to suit the informational -- though certainly not the political -- needs of the
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consumer." He also urges more attention to "marketing" of its product on the part
of the Intelligence Community.
Johnson, Rob. (2005). Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community: An
Ethnographic Study. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence.
The author conducted several hundred interviews with intelligence community
analysts and used these data to characterize the organizational culture of the
analytic enterprise within the US intelligence community. Characteristics are
broken down into systemic, systematic, idiosyncratic, and communicative
variables. The study uses this methodology to develop several recommendations
for improving analysis.
Jones, Morgan D. (1998). The Thinker’s Toolkit: 14 Powerful Techniques for
Problem Solving. New York, NY: Three Rivers Press.
Former CIA analyst Morgan Jones provides techniques that are easy to learn and
easy to apply, requiring no more equipment than a pencil and a legal pad. Armed
with The Thinker’s Toolkit, anyone in business can start making better decisions
today – with immediate benefits to the bottom line.
Kamarck, Elaine C. (October 2005). Transforming the Intelligence Community:
Improving the Collection and Management of Information. Transformation of
Organization Series, IBM Center for the Business of Government.
Since the end of the Cold War, the intelligence community has engaged in much
soul searching but with little action. While the 9/11 attacks have prompted action,
the solutions enacted so far do not get to some of the real world problems in the
community. The field of knowledge management is a convenient starting point
for attempting to understand what has to happen for the IC to become capable of
dealing with 21st century threats. Knowledge management suggests that the IC of
the future should seek to combine the tacit knowledge of the organization with its
explicit knowledge. The report concludes with eight recommendations aimed at
building a different, more comprehensive intelligence community.
Khalsa, Sundri. (2004). Forecasting Terrorism: Indicators and Proven Analytic
Techniques. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Terrorist attacks happen after years of careful planning; however, these plans
always leave a trail of activities—a road map to the terrorists' forthcoming
actions. These indicators include terrorist travel, movement of weapons, training,
target surveillance, and tests of security. This guidebook identifies 68 such
indicators and shows how to analyze them using a step-by-step explanation. It
also includes safeguards against 38 of the 42 common warning pitfalls that
experts have identified. That analysis then yields warnings that can prevent
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attacks and save lives. The methodology can be applied to any intelligence topic
(not just terrorism) by simply changing the list of indicators.
Warning failures are rarely due to inadequate collection; they are more frequently
due to intelligence that has been ignored because it is delivered with weak
analysis. With this model, author Sundri Khalsa brings sophisticated analysis
methodology to security forces everywhere, promising a safer world.
This methodology was characterized by the Unit Chief of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) Counterterrorism Threat Monitoring Unit as "light-years
ahead," while officials in the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) have identified
this system as "the bedrock for the evolving approach to terrorism analysis," and
an "unprecedented forecasting model." This guide will be of interest to policy
makers, journalists, police authorities, and concerned citizens.
Kindsvater, Larry. (2003). “The Need to Reorganize the Intelligence Community.”
Studies in Intelligence, 47:1.
The Intelligence Community (IC) should be reorganized to more concertedly,
effectively, and efficiently address today’s national security intelligence needs.
No one (except the Director of Central Intelligence) and no organizational entity
is actually responsible for bringing together in a unified manner the entire IC’s
collection and analytic capabilities to go against individual national security
missions and threats, such as terrorism, North Korea, the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, and China, create new Community-wide, mission-oriented
centers and have a leader who is truly “in charge.” Taken together, these changes
would fundamentally revamp the way the IC functions.
The changes recommended in this paper would fundamentally alter how the IC
actually functions, making substantive national security missions/issues/threats
the driving managerial force across the IC, and creating organized entities with
someone in charge who is responsible for Community-wide efforts against
specific national security missions. This arrangement would dramatically reduce
the intelligence collection (stovepipe) management and organizational orientation
of the IC. Moreover, it would place a DCI with expanded authorities at the top of
an organization, the Central Intelligence Agency, that has an IC-wide (corporate)
mission, responsibility, and authority (Kindsvater).
Lahneman, William J. (2005). “Knowledge Sharing in the Intelligence Community
Since 9/11.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,
17(4): 614-633.
Since the quality of virtually all security and many foreign policies depend upon
them, intelligence products constitute one extremely important type of knowledge
product. Good intelligence analysis depends upon high-quality information
getting to the appropriate analysts at the proper time so that knowledge creation
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can occur. The article describes current research in the field of knowledge
management and applies pertinent findings to analyze the flow of information and
the creation of knowledge in the intelligence community. It then analyzes recent
reform initiatives to determine if they are likely to improve or degrade knowledge
management.
Lahneman, William J. (2004). “Outsourcing the IC’s Stovepipes?” International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 16(4): 573-593.
The article surveys the business literature on outsourcing and determines why
businesses continue to expand their use of this tool despite initial
disappointments. Next, the needs and constraints of businesses are compared and
contrasted with those of intelligence organizations, with the finding that both
types of organizations have many of the same needs for both security and
knowledge sharing. The article outlines the elements of the intelligence cycle that
are candidates for outsourcing, argues that increased outsourcing would improve
intelligence analysis, and offers a strategy for expanding outsourcing within the
intelligence community.
Lefebvre, Stéphane. (2004). “A Look at Intelligence Analysis.” International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 17(2): 231-264.
In the days that followed the tragic terrorist attacks that took place against the
U.S. on September 11, 2001 several analysts and politicians were quick to assign
blame to the U.S. intelligence agencies, in particular the CIA and the FBI. That
these agencies could not prevent the attacks was considered an immense failure.
Intelligence analysis, is not done in a vacuum, it needs a bureaucratic structure to
hire analysts, support their work, and channel their judgments to policy
consumers (IJIC Abstract).
Looney, Robert E. (2004). “DARPA’s Policy Analysis Market for Intelligence:
Outside the Box or Off the Wall?” International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence, 17(3): 405-419.
In 2003, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) proposed
and subsequently backed off a plan to set up a kind of futures market, a Policy
Analysis Market (PAM), that would allow investors to earn profits by betting on
the likelihood of such events as regime changes in the Middle East. Critics,
mainly politicians and newspaper op-ed writers, attacked the futures project on
the grounds that it was unethical and in bad taste to accept wagers on the fate of
foreign leaders and the likelihood of terrorist attacks. The project was canceled a
day after it was announced. Its head, retired Admiral John Poindexter,
subsequently resigned.
The debate over the Policy Analysis Market was quite contentious, but few
answers have been found to several critical questions: How were the markets
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supposed to work? What were PAM’s underlying theoretical and empirical
assumptions? What was PAM supposed to produce in the way of intelligence?
Was the project an innovative way of thinking outside the box or just an off-thewall idea?
Lowenthal, Mark M. (2000). Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Washington,
DC: CQ Press.
The world of intelligence is filled with intrigue, but at its core, the informationsecret or otherwise-is valuable to governments for the power it affords policy
makers. With the constant need for background, context, and warning as well as
an assessment of risks, benefits, and likely outcomes, the intelligence community
plays a crucial role in policy formation. Lowenthal adeptly describes the
development of this community while showing students how the various stages of
the intelligence process serve an intelligence agenda that has changed
dramatically in this post-Cold War, post-9/11 world. In this thoroughly revised
second edition, Lowenthal updates each and every chapter, including new
material on the infamous Robert Hanssen and Wen Ho Lee cases. Two new
chapters significantly round out coverage: one on intelligence reform and another
that takes a comparative look at intelligence in Britain, France, Russia, Israel, and
China. This new edition also takes into account the impact and effects the war on
terrorism now has on collection, analysis, and counter intelligence, as well as the
ethical and moral issues surrounding these tasks (Synopsis from amazon.com).
MacDonald, Margaret M. and Anthony G. Oettinger. (2002). "Information
Overload: Managing Intelligence Technologies." Harvard International
Review, 24(3): 44-48.
Advances in scientific knowledge, translated into new technology, have made
previously unmanageable intelligence tasks feasible and greatly increased the
speed at which intelligence professionals perform traditional activities. And yet,
problems that have always plagued intelligence seem impervious to the
information revolution. The intelligence community and its customers no longer
suffer from information scarcity but from information overload. Analysis must
cover enormous quantities of data, in which valuable information may at best be
implicit. Users still complain that the information pushed to them is not what they
want or is not in a form they can use. On the other hand, knowing what to pull and
how to pull it requires a rather sophisticated user -- and that user may overlook an
important resource. As it collects intelligence, the intelligence community must
constantly maintain a balance between reliance on technical means and more
traditional sources (MacDonald and Oettinger).
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Mahle, Melissa Boyle. (2004). Denial and Deception: An Insider’s View of the CIA
From Iran-Contra to 9/11. New York: Nation Books.
Focuses on the performance of the CIA’s Directorate of Operations, but raises
several issues that affect the Directorate of Intelligence. Also analyzes negative
effects of the rapid turnover in the CIA’s leadership during the 19980s and 90s.
Marchio, James D. (2005). “The Evolution and Relevance of Joint Intelligence
Centers”. Studies in Intelligence, 49(1).
One of the most common problems in joint operations is that of intelligence. The
preferred solution lies in the establishment of a joint intelligence center.
Information from all sources is fed into this central collecting point where it is
collated, evaluated, and disseminated. Such an agency benefits not only the joint
force commander, but all major commanders involved by currently posting them
on the latest enemy information available.
Marrin, Stephen P. (2004). “CIA's Kent School: Improving Training for New
Analysts.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence,
16(4): 609-637.
This article provides the history behind the creation of CIA's Sherman Kent
School in 2000, describes the CIA's career analyst program for new analysts circa
mid-2002 (based on interviews with the Kent School’s director and three program
managers), assesses the hypothetical benefits that improved training could have
on institutional output, and places the training program back within institutional
context by arguing that improved training won't be able to achieve its potential if
organizational structures and bureaucratic processes are not aligned in ways that
are consistent with an analyst's acquisition and application of analytic expertise.
Marrin, Stephen P. (2003). “Homeland Security and the Analysis of Foreign
Intelligence.” Intelligencer, 13(2): 25-36.
This background paper describes how foreign intelligence analysis contributes to
homeland security. It begins with a description of the structure and operations of
the intelligence community, and then focuses more tightly on CIA’s analytic
practices before addressing the role of the DCI’s Counterterrorist Center in
providing intelligence analysis to national level decisionmakers. This paper
provides similar content but at a much greater level of granularity to the
subsection titled “An Analyst’s Daily Taskings” and “The Finished Product” on
pages 6-8 of the July 2004 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s Report on
the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq.
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Marrin, Stephen P., and Jonathan D. Clemente. (2006). “Improving Intelligence
Analysis by Looking to the Medical Profession.” International Journal of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 18(4): 707-729.
Intelligence agencies might benefit from assessing existing medical practices for
possible use in improving the accuracy of intelligence analysis and its
incorporation into policymaking. The processes used by the medical profession to
ensure diagnostic accuracy may provide specific models for Intelligence
Community use that could improve the accuracy of analytic procedures. The
medical profession’s way of accumulation, organization, and use of information
for purposes of decisionmaking could also provide a model for the national
security field to adopt in its quest for more effective means of information
transfer. Some limitations to the analogy are inevitable due to intrinsic differences
between the fields, but the study of medicine could provide intelligence
practitioners with a valuable source of insight into various reforms with the
potential to improve the craft of intelligence.
Marrin, Stephen P. (2005). “Preventing Intelligence Failures By Learning From
the Past.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 17(4):
655-672.
This article profiles the strategic surprise and intelligence failure literatures to
derive ideas for reforms—including various means to improve the accuracy of
intelligence such as alternative analysis or competitive analysis--that could
improve the quality of intelligence analysis and possibly prevent future
intelligence failures. It concludes: "The identification of causes of past failure
leads to kernels of wisdom in the form of process modifications that could make
the intelligence product more useful. A more effective, more accurate intelligence
capability may still be vulnerable to the cognitive and institutional pathologies
that cause failure, but a self-conscious and rigorous program based on the lessons
derived from the existing literature would strengthen the intelligence product.
This might lead to greater policymaker ability to respond to challenges, and
thereby contribute to the national security of the United States."
McIvor, Anthony D., ed. (2005). Rethinking the Principles of War. Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press.
Part Five – “Intelligence: Winning the Silent Wars” – contains the following
chapters: Rethinking War and Intelligence, William M. Nolte; Beyond
Intelligence Reform: The Case for a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs, Deborah
G. Barger; The Weakest Link: Intelligence for Preemptive and Preventive
Military Action, Richard L. Russell; Making the Case: Defense
Counterintelligence as a Strategic Asset, Anthony D. McIvor; Does Intelligence
Have a Future Tense?, Wesley K. Wark; Intelligence Transformation Past and
Future: The Evolution of War and U.S. Intelligence, Michael Warner; Refocusing
Intelligence: The Art of Analysis, Keith M. Masback.
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McLaughlin, John E. (1997). “New Challenges and Priorities for Analysis.” Defense
Intelligence Journal, 5(2): 11-21.
Changes in the world around us and in the expectations of consumers "add up to a
fundamental shift in the analytical priorities for CIA and others in the
[Intelligence] Community.... Tapping into analytic expertise across the
Community and coordinating on collection activity will be essential to overcome
budget and personnel constraints." (Abstract from
http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/D_folder/defij_analysis.html.)
Medina, Carmen A. (2002). "What to Do When Traditional Models Fail: The
Coming Revolution in Intelligence Analysis." Studies in Intelligence 46(3):
23-28.
The great challenge facing analysts and managers in the DI is providing real
insight to smart policymakers. Intelligence officers have long believed that
careful attention to the tradecraft of intelligence analysis would lead to work that
added value to the information available to policymakers. During its 50-plus
years, the CIA evolved a model that needed only successful execution to produce
quality intelligence analysis. When we faltered, we blamed the analysts, but not
the model.
What if the failing, however, lies not with the analysts but with the model they are
asked to follow? Customer needs and preferences are changing rapidly, as is the
environment in which intelligence analysis operates. Yet the DI’s approach to
analysis has hardly changed over the years. Stability is often comforting, but in
the DI’s case change may be what is most needed. Analysts today must add value
in an era of information overabundance, dig deep to surpass the analytic abilities
of their customers, and reach beyond political analysis, an area in which it is
particularly hard to provide value to policymakers (Medina).
Mena, Jesús. (2003). Investigative Data Mining for Security and Criminal Detection.
Burlington, MA: Elsevier Science.
Investigative Data Mining for Security and Criminal Detection is the first book to
outline how data mining technologies can be used to combat crime in the 21st
century. It introduces security managers, law enforcement investigators, counterintelligence agents, fraud specialists, and information security analysts to the
latest data mining techniques and shows how they can be used as investigative
tools. Readers will learn how to search public and private databases and networks
to flag potential security threats and root out criminal activities even before they
occur.
The groundbreaking book reviews the latest data mining technologies including
intelligent agents, link analysis, text mining, decision trees, self-organizing maps,
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machine learning, and neural networks. Using clear, understandable language, it
explains the application of these technologies in such areas as computer and
network security, fraud prevention, law enforcement, and national defense.
International case studies throughout the book further illustrate how these
technologies can be used to aid in crime prevention. Investigative Data Mining for
Security and Criminal Detection will also serve as an indispensable resource for
software developers and vendors as they design new products for the law
enforcement and intelligence communities.
Moore, David T., Lisa Krizan, and Elizabeth J. Moore. “Evaluating Intelligence: A
Competency-Based Model.” International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence, 18(2): 204-220.
When strategic surprise confronts a nation, the accusation of intelligence failure
often follows. The trigger is something dire: an attack on the nation’s warships or
mainland, the presence of nuclear missiles on a nearby island, the fall of a key
ally in a volatile region, or an invasion of another ally by a regional bully.
Conversely, only rarely do accolades give credit to intelligence for strategic
success. Conventional excuses to protect sources and methods notwithstanding,
this reflects a widespread lack of understanding of the factors that determine
intelligence success. Yet, the interpretation of failure or success depends on
accurately evaluating that unique form of knowledge provided to policy—and
decisionmaking consumers—in other words, the evaluation of intelligence.
A competency-based model for defining analysis offers one means of evaluating
intelligence. This model leads to both improved intelligence production—
resulting in the products provided to intelligence consumers, and an improved
intelligence process—the means by which that product is produced.
Nance, Malcolm W. (2003). The Terrorist Recognition Handbook. Guilford, CT:
Lyons Press.
Whether they are acting as a one-person cell, or with a sophisticated global
finance and logistics network, terrorists can be members of nearly any race, sex,
religion, or political persuasion. But every terrorist operation always has certain
characteristics, and the only effective way to identify and prevent terrorists is to
observe their behavior and analyze it with an intelligence-based approach. For the
first time, a former U.S. military anti-terrorism intelligence officer reveals
thousands of Terrorist Attack Pre-incident Indicators (TAPIs) in The Terrorist
Recognition Handbook.
With dozens of incident case studies and hundreds of illustrations, The Terrorist
Recognition Handbook is the first and only commercially available handbook that
debunks the aura of mystery surrounding terrorist activities as it uncovers the
terrorists' means, methods, organization, and motivations. It will be an invaluable
resource and training guide for police officers, SWAT teams, federal officials,
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security companies, local water boards, chemical plants, oil refineries, power
generating facilities, electrical and telephone utilities, airport facilities, public
transportation officials, education officials, journalists, and ordinary citizens.
Nolte, William. “Keeping Pace with the Revolution in Intelligence Affairs.” Studies
in Intelligence, 48/1: 1-9.
The article observes that rapid changes in military and diplomatic spheres –
embodied most prominently by the Revolution in Military Affairs – implies that a
Revolution in Intelligence Affairs is imminent or already in progress. The
intelligence community must embrace this concept, study its ramifications, and
adapt to the new circumstances if it is to avoid failure or irrelevance. In this
regard, the intelligence community needs to focus less on structure and more on
behavior.
O'Connell, Kevin and Robert Tomes. (2004). “Keeping the Information Edge.”
Policy Review, 122: 19-38.
Despite advances in information technology and knowledge management within
the most visible area of national security — the military — America’s overall
commitment to preserving its information edge across the larger security
bureaucracy foundered during the 1990s. To be sure, the situation is improving.
Great strides in information sharing are being made. Yet we contend that despite
significant initiatives to transform, government-wide information sharing
innovations and intelligence-integration initiatives are evolving too slowly.
We believe that the coming year will witness an unparalleled national debate over
the future of American intelligence. Attention at the official level will be
necessary to effect change, but by itself it is insufficient. What will also be needed
is a reasoned public debate about the purposes and dynamics of U.S. intelligence.
The heated debate over the state of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, charges
that the intelligence cycle is being politicized, and a perceived lack of innovation
in the integration of diverse intelligence sources are likely to amplify arguments
over intelligence modernization.
All of these are appropriate considerations for an intelligence transformation
debate, but they are not necessarily useful for organizing action. We believe that
the appropriate research question for the policy community is not who in the U.S.
government — intelligence agency, law enforcement entity, or other — failed to
react to specific information about the individuals associated with the September
11 attacks. Rather, policymakers should be asking what levels of political,
financial, and intellectual resources leaders and the public at large are willing to
commit — and whether that commitment will last (O’Connell and Tomes).
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Odom, William E. (2003). Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Security depends on intelligence. This is a discussion of basic problems in
American intelligence and how to fix them, outlining fundamental restructuring of
this vast network of agencies, technology and human agents. Odom’s
recommendations for revamping this essential component of American security
are here available for general readers as well as for policymakers. While giving an
overview of the world of US intelligence, Odom shows that the failure of
American intelligence on 9/11 had much to do with the complex bureaucratic
relationships existing among the various components of the Intelligence
Community. The sustained fragmentation within the Intelligence Community
since World War II is part of the story; the blurring of security and intelligence
duties is another. Odom describes the various components of American
intelligence in order to give readers an understanding of how complex they are
and what can be done to make them more effective in providing timely
intelligence and more efficient in using their large budgets. He shows definitively
that they cannot be remedied with quick fixes but require deep study of the entire
bureaucracy and the commitment of the US government to implement the
necessary reforms (Synopsis from amazon.com).
Ott, Marvin. (1994). “Shaking up the CIA.” Foreign Policy, 93: 132.
Examines concerns over the performance and integrity of the Directorate of
Intelligence, the analytic arm of the Central Intelligence Agency. A highly
capable, deeply flawed instrument of policy support; Director James Woolsey;
Why the intelligence cognoscenti in the press and the congressional oversight
committees have largely ignored the DI; Expected rise in importance of DI;
Criteria for judging intelligence analysis; DI's three significant weaknesses;
Primary tasks.
Pappas, Aris A. and James Simon. (2002). “Daunting Challenges, Hard Decisions:
The Intelligence Community: 2001 – 2015.” Studies in Intelligence, 46(1).
Over the past decade, commission upon commission has urged reform of the
loose confederation that is the US Intelligence Community. Opposed by
implacable champions of the status quo, precious few of these commissions have
provoked meaningful change. Ten years after the end of the Cold War, the threat
of a nuclear Armageddon has receded, but the collapse of world communism and
its repercussions are still works in progress. In a world with only one remaining
superpower, even small and materially poor states and groups can pose terrible
threats.
This paper argues for a fundamental review and change in a strong and heavily
traditional community of proud organizations. These organizations are
challenged by attacks on what may be their most treasured measure of self-worth:
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their relevancy. Intelligence must be shaped to reflect the world in which it lives.
Success will not be measured by our ability to find marginally better ways to use
our existing resources, but in our ability to seek out and employ whatever is
needed to do the new job. Neither easy nor cheap, the costs and risks of doing
anything else are simply unacceptable. When the world changes, the single most
important requirement for intelligence is to change with it (Pappas and Simon).
Peters, Katherina McIntire. (1996). “Intelligence Lost.” Government Executive,
28(11): 20.
In the next 10 years, nearly half the agency's civilian employees could retire,
taking with them their invaluable experience and knowledge accumulated over
many years of service. Budget and personnel cuts, a revolution in technology,
and the end of the Cold War have converged to force a major shift in the way DIA
does business. At no time in the intelligence agency's 35-year history has it been
required to do so much, so quickly-and in coming years, with so little depth of
experience.
The trend alarms some Pentagon planners, especially as the field commanders in
the shrinking military become more dependent on DIA for tactical intelligence.
And while field commanders are becoming more reliant on DIA for intelligence,
fewer employees of DIA have military experience. To provide the intelligence
support the military community will need in the future, DIA will need more
people with broad analytical skills and technological proficiency (Peters).
Petersen, Martin. (2005). “Toward a Stronger Intelligence Product: Making the
Analytic Review Process Work.” Studies in Intelligence (Unclassified
Edition), 49(1).
Like the tides, criticism of the analytic review process is predictable, relentless,
eternal, and potentially destructive. Those who argue for more power to the
drafter present a bill of particulars that alleges the process does little to improve
the product, reduces judgments to the lowest common denominator, stifles
creativity, and takes analysis out of the hands of the experts. Those who defend
the review process counter that it sharpens focus, guarantees that the piece
addresses policymaker concerns, taps all relevant expertise, and ensures a
corporate product. Both sides agree on one thing—that there ought to be fewer
layers of review—and both miss the key point.
Posner, Richard A. (2005). Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the
Wake of 9/11. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Richard A. Posner, in the first full-length study of the post-9/11 movement for
intelligence reform, argues that the 9/11 Commission's analysis, on which
Congress relied heavily in enacting the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, was superficial and its organizational proposals unsound.
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The Commission, followed by Congress, exaggerated the benefits of centralizing
control over intelligence; neglected the relevant scholarship dealing with surprise
attacks, organization theory, and the principles of intelligence, and the experience
of foreign nations—some of which have a longer history of fighting terrorism
than the United States; and as a result ignored the psychological, economic,
historical, sociological, and comparative dimensions of the issue of intelligence
reform.
Posner explains, however, that a ray of hope remains: The reorganization
provisions of the new Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act are so
vague—as a result of intense politicking—that the actual shape of the reorganized
system will depend critically on decisions made by the President in implementing
the Act. In a searing critique, Posner exposes the pitfalls created by the new
legislation, identifies the issues overlooked by the 9/11 Commission and
Congress, and suggests directions for real reform. (Posner)
Prados, John. (2004). “Intelligence: No Easy Fix.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
60(5): 17-19.
A struggle by entrenched parties is likely to torpedo genuine intelligence
community reform; the next CIA will not differ much from the old one.
Quinn, Jr., James L. (2000). “Staffing the Intelligence Community: The Pros and
Cons of an Intelligence Reserve.” International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence, 13(2): 160-170.
Considerable debate has taken place in recent years, both in Congress and within
the Intelligence Community (IC), about the formation of a reserve component
specifically designed for the IC. Responsible members of the IC and
policymaking communities seem to be committed to the idea that there will be an
intelligence reserve. According to Dr. Mark M. Lowenthal, a former staff director
of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, ``This is something
that’s going to happen.’’ But significant details remain to be worked out. While
there was virtual unanimity - at least among those interviewed here - that some
kind of civilian intelligence reserve would be established, wide disagreement
existed on exactly what such a program might entail. The benefits and limitations
of such a program, and an assessment of a variety of factors that would be critical
to its implementation, including various suggestions as to the type of intelligence
reserve that might be appropriate are examined here. The objective is not to
recommend a specific policy, but rather to lay out options and arguments.
Ramsbotham, David. (1995). “Analysis and Assessment for Peacekeeping
Operations.” Intelligence and National Security, 10(3): 162-174.
The aim of this essay is to examine the role of intelligence analysis and
assessment in support of peacekeeping operations in a changing world.
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Necessarily, this means the essay will focus on what [the author] perceive[s] to be
the intelligence needs of the United Nations (UN), because its global
responsibilities ‘to maintain international peace and security’ make it the primary
‘employer’ of peacekeeping forces. This essay will examine the intelligence needs
of the three types of missions included under the generic term peacekeeping:
preventative action, conflict resolution (whether traditional peacekeeping or peace
enforcement), and post conflict reconstruction (or peace-building), each of which
will be examined in turn.
Rieber, Steven Rieber and Neil Thomason, “Creation of a National Institute for
Analytic Methods,” Studies in Intelligence 49/4: 71-77.
The article cites evidence that the opinions of experts regarding the types of
analytic methods that actually work may be misleading or seriously wrong.
Accordingly, past practices of compiling best practices as a way to train future
analysts might hamper rather than improve analysis. The authors argue for a
systematic approach using rigorous scientific studies to determine what practices
work and what doesn’t in intelligence analysis.
Rieber, Steven. (2004). “Intelligence Analysis and Judgmental Calibration.”
International Journal of Intelligence & Counter Intelligence, 17(1): 97-112.
Evidence exists that experts in international affairs—including intelligence
analysts—are poor at estimating the probability that a predicted outcome will
occur. The probability judgments made by medical experts are equally poor: this
indicates that rapid feedback about whether the outcome has occurred (“outcome
feedback”) is not sufficient to ensure good judgment about probabilities. What
does seem to help is “calibration feedback,” that is, data on how well one’s
subjective probability estimates correspond to the number of correct predictions.
Calibration feedback should therefore be tested as a training technique for
intelligence analysts, and intelligence analysts ought to be provided with on-thejob feedback about their own calibration. Making accurate probability judgments,
a skill essential to intelligence analysis, is one that apparently can be improved. In
addition to training and feedback, two other techniques might enhance this vital
skill: one involves encouraging analysts to think in terms of frequencies instead of
just percentage likelihoods, while the other stresses consideration of alternative
reasons and hypotheses.
Ronczkowski, Michael. (2004). Terrorism and Organized Hate Crime: Intelligence
Gathering, Analysis, and Investigations. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
In response to the current terrorist threat, law enforcement agencies at every level
have expanded technological and intelligence-gathering initiatives in order to
support new tactical, investigative and deployment strategies. The demand for
homeland security requires that agencies hire professional and specially trained
criminal and intelligence analysts to find and pre-empt any potential threat.
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Agencies must now determine how to train these analysts and properly identify
and respond to critical intelligence. Terrorism and Organized Hate Crime:
Intelligence Gathering, Analysis, and Investigations provides a framework for
exploring the issues that all new or existing analysts and investigators must face,
including what information to gather, how to analyze it, and the effectiveness of
crime analysts investigating terrorism. Training in proactive analytical-based
investigation has been around for less than thirty years. Events now mandate that
unavoidable importance of understanding "terrorism analysis." This expert
overview provides the crucial foundation of criminal intelligence gathering and
analysis and defines the nature of terrorism and its practitioners, subjects of vital
importance if local agencies are to play an effective role in the battle against terror
(Synopsis from amazon.com).
Rovner, Joshua, and Austin Long. (2005). “The Perils of Shallow Theory:
Intelligence Reform and the 9/11 Commission.” International Journal of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 18(4): 609-637.
Despite its unique influence on the current reorganization of American
intelligence, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States
(the 9/11 Commission) got it wrong. In examining the theories of failure
presented by the Commission and assessing how closely its recommendations are
linked to those theories, two principal arguments are here presented. First, the
proposed reforms are mostly unrelated to the postulated causes of failure. Second,
the theories are underdeveloped, contradictory, and basically unsatisfying on their
own terms. For these reasons, large organizational reforms are unlikely to
significantly improve intelligence performance.
Russel, Kevin. (2004). “The Subjectivity of Intelligence Analysis and Implications
for the U.S. National Security Strategy.” SAIS Review, 24(1): 147-163.
The language used to describe intelligence estimates as objective reflections of
available evidence has led in some cases to a misunderstanding of the role of
intelligence in supporting the decision to go to war in Iraq. Saying that the
estimate that identified the threats was either "right" or "wrong" ignores the
probabilistic nature of intelligence assessments and the necessary subjective
elements that make them useful to policymakers. By making this clear in the case
of Iraq, we can separate the crucial question of how policy should be decided in
the face of increased uncertainty and even more elusive enemies than have been
faced in the past. Only then does it make sense to say how intelligence can be
made more useful, leaving behind the misguided question of whether the
intelligence community was right or wrong on Iraq.
Samuelson, Douglas. (2005). “Agents of Change.” OR/MS Today, 32(1): pg. 26.
Agent-based modeling (ABM) encompasses approaches and practitioners from
operations research, artificial intelligence, social network theory, cognitive

37

science and other various disciplines. The basic idea is to expand traditional
simulation to include entities whose behavior can change over time, depending on
the circumstances they encounter. The field has grown explosively in numerous
directions over the past 10 years, with important applications in war gaming,
intelligence analysis, organizational performance, social policy and other areas.
Many agent-based models now are complex enough, and deal with sufficiently
sensitive issues, that validation becomes problematic. There may be a need to
focus less on prediction and reliance on some physical reality external to the
subject of interest, so there is a move away from traditional ideas of validation
and toward credible use.
Sangillo, Gregg and Siobhan Gorman. (2004). “Smarter Intelligence: A Post-9/11
Priority.” National Journal, 36(21): 1572-1579.
This article profiles ten experts on intelligence reform, from both within and
outside the U.S. Intelligence Community. The result is a collection of ideas on
how to strengthen analysis, streamline production, and adapt to the global age of
information.
Scalingi, Paula L. (1995). “Proliferation and Arms Control.” Intelligence and
National Security, 10(3): 150-161.
Proliferation and arms control are not ‘new’ analytical priorities as such. Both
have been among the more important intelligence responsibilities for years.
Intelligence traditionally is responsible for monitoring compliance with arms
control, nonproliferation and technology transfer agreements and for assessing
current and prospective proliferation activities on a global basis.
What is new is the recognition that proliferation, along with increasing ethnic and
nationalist strife is emerging as the foremost threat to international stability.
Consequently, governments have been expanding the scope of their national
security policy agendas in order better to deter, reduce, eliminate, or regulate the
transfer of a wide range of weapons, equipment, related technologies, and
materials. Because policy drives intelligence requirements, analysts whose
‘accounts’ focus on the proliferation threat or arms control support are facing an
increasing array of challenges – at a time when many countries are cutting
defense and intelligence resources due to budgetary constraints.
Such a world is not far in the future. Electronic dissemination will fundamentally
change the relationship between the intelligence analysts and his or her customer,
whether that customer is a military commander or a civilian policy-maker;
moreover, in doing so electronic dissemination will bring significant changes in
the ways in which intelligence analysts work.
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Schrage, Michael. (2005, February 20). “What Percent Is 'Slam Dunk'?;
Give Us Odds on Those Estimates.” Washington Post, p. B01
The controversial decision to reorganize America's sprawling intelligence
establishment has set in motion the most sweeping bureaucratic change for
sensors, spies and satellites since the end of World War II. Unfortunately, the
odds are excellent that this multibillion dollar structural shuffle -- capped last
week by the appointment of veteran diplomat John Negroponte as the new
national intelligence director -- will do little to improve the quality of intelligence
analysis for this country.
Why? Because America's intelligence community doesn't like odds. Yet the
simplest and most cost-effective innovation that community could adopt would be
to embrace them. It's time to require national security analysts to assign numerical
probabilities to their professional estimates and assessments as both a matter of
rigor and of record. Policymakers can't weigh the risks associated with their
decisions if they can't see how confident analysts are in the evidence and
conclusions used to justify those decisions. The notion of imposing intelligence
accountability without intelligent counting -- without numbers -- is a fool's errand.
Segell, Glen M. “Intelligence Methodologies Applicable to the Madrid Train
Bombings, 2004.” International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence, 18(2): 221-238.
An inherent difficulty facing intelligence agencies led to the inability to prevent
the al-Qaeda Madrid commuter train bombing on 11 March 2004—exactly 911
days after the 11 September 2001 (9/11) al-Qaeda attacks in the United States.
Intelligence analysts can be 100 percent accurate on future events only if the
information is 100 percent specific and certain. In general, the intelligence agency
data gatherers and analysts face severe limitations, given that their mandate is not
to be historians in describing the past but rather to be accurate in both forecasting
and predicting the future. To be sure, there are few good sources of data on events
yet to happen, as is the dilemma where too many variables exist. This is the
essential difference between ad hoc intelligence gathering and analysis and
specific actionable intelligence gathering and analysis.
Given this, three potential methodologies are available in ad hoc intelligence
gathering and analysis, inferred and referred to in seminal literature, to predict and
forecast an act or event that has not been clearly identified These are: (1) trends
and patterns, (2) frequency, and (3) probability. The three methodologies are
broad in conceptualization, given that at any given stage the emphasis may be on
one or more or, indeed, that all three may be utilized simultaneously.
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Sharfman, Peter. (1995). “Intelligence Analysis in an Age of Electronic
Dissemination.” Intelligence and National Security, 10(3): 201-211.
Imagine a world in which the technologies and the concepts of the Internet were
applied to the transmission of intelligence from the ‘producer’ to the user,
whether that user is a policy-maker in the capital or a military commander in the
field. Intelligence agencies would create electronic databases into which their
products would be entered. Users would search these databases for intelligence
relevant to their concerns, and then download this intelligence on to the users’
own computer, where it could be combined as desired with other intelligence
products drawn from other databases on the same network.
Sims, Jennifer E and Burton Gerber. (2005). Transforming U.S. Intelligence.
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Transforming U.S. Intelligence supports the mandate of the new director of
national intelligence by offering both careful analysis of existing strengths and
weaknesses in U.S. intelligence and specific recommendations on how to fix its
problems without harming its strengths. These recommendations, based on
intimate knowledge of the way U.S. intelligence actually works, include
suggestions for the creative mixing of technologies with new missions to bring
about the transformation of U.S. intelligence without incurring unnecessary harm
or expense. The goal is the creation of an intelligence community that can rapidly
respond to developments in international politics, such as the emergence of
nimble terrorist networks while reconciling national security requirements with
the rights and liberties of American citizens. (Sims & Gerber)
Sloan, Stephen. (2002). “Meeting the Terrorist Threat: The Localization of
Counter Terrorism Intelligence.” Police Practice and Research, 3(4): 337345.
It has long been recognized that intelligence is at the heart of countering
terrorism. It is vital that intelligence capabilities are refined and extended beyond
the national intelligence community since ultimately the state and local authorities
must be involved in identifying, analyzing, and responding to threats, acts, etc. By
achieving the necessary integration between all levels of government, the U.S. can
more effectively develop measures and defense against terrorism (Sloan).
Stack, Kevin P. (1998). “Competitive Intelligence.” Intelligence and National
Security, 13(4): 194-202.
In 1976, the Intelligence Community experimented with a “Team B” approach to
competitive intelligence, where a group of outside Soviet experts examined the
same intelligence as the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence, yet produced
drastically different conclusions regarding the Soviet Union’s capabilities and
intensions. Even though the experiment ultimately ended in a polarized debate
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between extremists and has been dubbed a failure ever since, proposals for Team
B exercises in national intelligence products have resurfaced in recent years.
While advocates of this approach argue that policymakers would benefit from this
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constraints of policymakers would contribute to a repeat failure of Team B
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communities, but the reality is that the Anglo-Saxon intelligence communities of
today exploit less than 10 percent of what is available from the private sector.
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private enterprise intelligence can make a contribution to national security; to
understand operational concepts from private enterprise intelligence which can
and should be adopted by the traditional government intelligence services; and
finally, to make an inventory of some of the specific private enterprise
intelligence capabilities which can be used by the government to achieve both
tactical results and sustained savings.
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transformed national security needs. Even if they are careful in defining a new
structure for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating national security
information, they cannot avoid difficult questions about how to improve security
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debate is essential to answering these questions. Clear guidelines, formulated in a
deliberative process, can assure public confidence in new policies. Information
technology can provide tools to minimize these conflicts, foster collaboration, and
help assure that the right information gets to the right people at the right time.
Nonetheless, missteps are inevitable. Procedures that provide accountability and
oversight can assure that lessons from early experiences strengthen the nation’s
information strategies to fight terrorism (Steinberg, Graham and Eggers).
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Resource]. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2001. Accessible
at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS16241L.
This Strategic Investment Plan for Intelligence Community Analysis (SIP)
provides the analytic community with the unprecedented opportunity to achieve
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the unifying goals of the DCI’s Strategic Intent and to translate today’s challenges
into tomorrow’s resource requirements. The historic willingness to begin
planning our future together stems, in part, from the growing perception that
collaboration is the best way to achieve common goals for: a
skilled, expert, diverse and more mobile work force enabled by technology and
armed with the best analytic tools; a collection-smart work force that is trained
and deployed and has the resources to assist collectors with
requirements, evaluation, and procurement; a collaborative work force that
leverages the production of each agency to provide the best Community support
to customers; and an outward-looking work force that systematically exploits the
information and expertise of sources beyond the Intelligence Community to
produce the most authoritative strategic and current analysis possible (Strategic
Investment Plan).
Swaka, Ken. (2004). “Strategic Intelligence: An Oxymoron.” Competitive
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A few exceptional companies aside, competitive intelligence for the most part has
not achieved a degree of sophistication that would enable it to play a regular role
in strategic planning and development. Intelligence analysis - the foundation for
strategic intelligence - has suffered from a general failure of analysts to apply
analytic methodologies, develop true insights, and present their conclusions with
the confidence necessary to gain management's ear. For managers, the benefits of
tactical intelligence are easier to measure. Truth be told, most Competitive
Intelligence practitioners don't have the choice of being tactical or strategic - they
need to do both. Emphasis needs to be placed on the area, which can provide the
most unique value. How do you set the right emphasis? First, determine how your
company sets strategy. Next, conduct a self-assessment. Then, evaluate how you
relate to strategic management. Finally, determine how your efforts are measured.
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for Strategic Intelligence Research.
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Teitelbaum, Lorne. (2005). The Impact of the Information Revolution on
Policymakers’ use of Intelligence Analysis. Santa Monica, CA: RAND
Corporation.
This dissertation compares how policymakers have traditionally used intelligence
with how they are using it today, examining the effects that new technology and
open sources of information, such as the World Wide Web, are having on how the
policy community uses intelligence. The author examines three foreign policy
cases from the late 1950s and early 1960s to establish how the traditional
intelligence-policy relationship evolved. He then describes three modern foreign
policy cases and analyzes how policymakers' use of intelligence to support the
policymaking process has changed. He concludes that the intelligence community
has tried to adapt to the information revolution with the adoption of a network
named Intelink but has not fully supported this network as a means for
disseminating intelligence to policymakers, nor have policymakers adopted it.
Internet and web-based sources of analysis have not become major contributors to
the policymaking process. Overall, policymakers still find intelligence analysis
useful for supporting the policymaking process, especially when it is conveyed
through a one-on-one intelligence briefing, but for situations that require the most
timely information, policymakers often rely on the telephone to call someone for
information, and more and more are relying on CNN.
Treverton, Gregory F. (2005). The Next Steps in Reshaping intelligence. Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
Two national commissions' findings helped to lay the groundwork for the
December 2004 intelligence reorganization bill. Most notably, the bill calls for a
new Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to head and coordinate the U.S.
Intelligence Community. Currently, the DNI has broad responsibilities but only
ambiguous authorities. Drawing on a number of projects for various intelligence
agencies, as well as additional research, the author of this paper looks at this
position of DNI and how it will interact and coordinate with intelligence agencies
and other elements of the Executive Branch. In addition to organizational
changes, the author looks at the cultural changes that need to take place in the
community, including those related to capacity building, issue-based collection,
analysis improvement, wider diversity of workforce, and targeting collection. In
particular, the paper highlights the importance of moving toward center-based
organizations and away from the "stovepipes" of the Cold War. In accomplishing
such goals, the DNI will begin to turn his formal authority into real authority.
Treverton, Gregory F. (2003). Intelligence: The Achilles Heel of the Bush Doctrine.
Arms Control Today, 33(6).
Highlights the incompetence of the U.S. intelligence to locate and preemptively
target weapons of mass destruction, as of September 2003. Strategy of the
administration of President Bush in making its case for war against Iraq, technical
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innovations in intelligence that may help identify suspicious facilities, and
limitations of the national strategy of the country.
Treverton, Gregory F. (2001). Reshaping National Intelligence in an Age of
Information. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
The world of intelligence has been completely transformed by the end of the Cold
War and the onset of an age of information. Prior to the 1990s, US government
intelligence had one principal target, [but] today, world intelligence has many
targets, numerous consumers, and too much information, most of which is not
owned by the U.S. government and is of widely varying reliability. In this bold
and penetrating study, Gregory Treverton offers his insider's views on how
intelligence gathering and analysis must change. He suggests why intelligence
needs to be both contrarian, leaning against the conventional wisdom, and
attentive to the longer term, leaning against the growing shorter time horizons of
Washington policy makers. He urges that the solving of intelligence puzzles tap
expertise outside government - in the academy, think tanks, and Wall Street - to
make these parties colleagues and co-consumers of intelligence, befitting the
changed role of government from doer to convener, mediator, and coalitionbuilder (www.amazon.com).
Turner, Michael A. (2005). Why Secret Intelligence Fails. Dulles, VA: Potomac
Books.
Michael Turner argues that the root causes of failures in American intelligence
can be found in the way it is organized and in the intelligence process itself.
Intelligence that has gone awry affects national decision making and, ultimately,
American national security. Intelligence officials are reluctant to talk about
intelligence successes, claiming "the secret of our success is the secret of our
success." But these officials also shy away from talking about failures, largely
because doing so would expose the failings of American intelligence and have an
impact on policy consumers who may become more reluctant to accept and act on
the intelligence they receive.
Rather than focusing on case studies, the book takes a holistic approach,
beginning with structural issues and all dysfunctions that emanate from them.
Turner explores each step of the intelligence cycle—priority setting, intelligence
collection, analysis, production, and dissemination—to identify the "inflection
points" within each stage that contribute to intelligence failures. Finally, he
examines a variety of plans that, if implemented, would reduce the likelihood of
intelligence failures.
While examining the causes of intelligence failures, Turner also explores
intelligence as a critical governmental activity, making the book an excellent
primer on secret intelligence. Turner writes in jargon-free prose for the informed
reader interested in foreign policy and national security policy matters and brings
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enough depth to his subject that even experts will find this a must-read. (Synopsis
from Amazon.com)
United States. Aspin-Brown Commission, Preparing for the 21st Century.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office (1996).
The Report of the Aspin/Brown Commission made a number of recommendations
regarding the organization of the Intelligence Community. Structural changes in
the NSC staff were proposed to enhance the guidance provided to intelligence
agencies. Global crime — terrorism, international drug trafficking, proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, and international organized crime — was given
special attention with recommendations for an NSC Committee on Global Crime.
The Commission also recommended designating the Attorney General to
coordinate the “nation’s law enforcement response to global crime,” and
clarifying the authority of intelligence agencies to collect information concerning
foreign persons abroad for law enforcement purposes. It urged that the sharing of
relevant information between the law enforcement and intelligence communities
be expanded, and their activities overseas be better coordinated. (Congressional
Research Service)
United States. (2004). The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New York, NY: W.
W. Norton & Co.
The result of months of intensive investigations and inquiries by a specially
appointed bipartisan panel, The 9/11 Commission Report is one of the most
important historical documents of the modern era. And while that fact alone
makes it worth owning, it is also a chilling and valuable piece of nonfiction: a
comprehensive and alarming look at one of the biggest intelligence failures in
history and the events that led up to it. The commission traces the roots of alQaeda's strategies along with the emergence of the 19 hijackers and how they
entered the United States and boarded airplanes. It details the missed
opportunities of law enforcement officials to avert disaster. Using transcripts of
cockpit voice recordings, the report describes events on board the planes along
with the chaotic reaction on the ground from nearly every level of government.
Going forward, the commission calls for a comprehensive overhaul of what it sees
as a deeply flawed and disjointed intelligence-gathering operation. The creation of
a post for a single National Security Director is recommended, along with the
creation of a National Counterterrorism Center. The report finds fault with the
approaches of both the Clinton and Bush administrations but, because they were a
bipartisan panel and the problems described are so systemic and far-reaching, they
stop short of assigning blame to any particular person or group. Credit must be
given to how readable the report is. At more than 500 pages, the writing is clear
and forceful and the information is made more accessible since it is free from
election politics and rancor. While the commission notes that future attacks are
probably inevitable, a coordinated preventive effort along with a clear plan to
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respond with efficiency can offer Americans some hope in a post-9/11 world.
(Synopsis from Amazon.com)
United States. General Accounting Office. Defense Acquisitions: Steps Needed to
Ensure Interoperability of Systems That Process Intelligence Data. Report
to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.
Washington, DC: GAO, 2003.
Making sure systems can work effectively together (interoperability) has been a
key problem for the Department of Defense (DOD) yet integral to its goals for
enhancing joint operations. Given the importance of being able to share
intelligence data quickly, [the GAO] assessed DOD’s initiative to develop a
common ground-surface-based intelligence system and to particularly examine (1)
whether DOD has adequately planned this initiative and (2) whether its process
for testing and certifying the interoperability of new systems is working
effectively.
GAO recommends that DOD enhance its planning to include a detailed migration
plan and schedule. GAO also recommends that DOD take steps needed to enforce
its process and determine why the services are slow to certify systems in order
that it can implement controls and incentives needed to spur compliance. DOD
generally agreed with GAO recommendations (GAO).

U.S. Senate. Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence
Assessments on Iraq. S. Rpt. 108-301, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess., June 2004.
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence's Report on the U.S. Intelligence
Community's Prewar Assessments on Iraq is intended to provide the Senate and
the American public with a substantial record of the facts underlying the
conclusions of the Committee regarding the intelligence community's prewar
assessments of Iraq's programs for weapons of mass destruction and its ties to
terrorism.
Waltz, Edward. (2003). Knowledge Management in the Intelligence Enterprise.
Norwood, MA: Artech House.
Written for professionals who are responsible for the management of an
intelligence enterprise operation in either the military or corporate setting, this is
the first easy-to-understand, system-level book that specifically applies
knowledge management principles, practices and technologies to the intelligence
domain.
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Watanabe, Frank. (1997). “Fifteen Axioms for Intelligence Analysts: How to
Succeed in the DI.” Studies in Intelligence (Unclassified Edition), No. 1.
From the Author: Before leaving the DI on a rotational assignment, I endeavored
to set down some of the axioms by which I have tried to live in my career.
Initially, this exercise was begun to provide some practical advice to a new
analyst joining my branch, but I eventually decided that these axioms might be of
interest to officers throughout the DI. Although I have not rigidly adhered to
them, they have served me well as general guides to professional conduct as a DI
analyst. To experienced analysts, many of the principles will sound like truisms
and, if that is the case, all the better. I just tried to codify general rules that guide
what we in the DI do on a daily basis, and I would not presume to invent new
tradecraft. But the new DI analyst, and more than a few old hands, would be well
served by remembering these 15 principles in their everyday conduct, as I suspect
that many will never be adopted officially.
Ward, Steven. (2002). “Counterpoint to ‘The Coming Revolution in Intelligence
Analysis’: Evolution Beats Revolution in Analysis.” Studies in Intelligence,
46(3): 29-36.
At its heart, “The Coming Revolution in Intelligence Analysis” is criticizing the
DI’s office-based culture. Many would argue that the problem is that the current
model for analysis has not been applied consistently across the Directorate. Many
of the shortcomings that Medina lists are the result of this uneven application and
the failure to solidify the corporate foundation of basic tradecraft skills.
Successful change in any organization requires either a dramatic and widely
accepted shift in basic principles or years of sustained attention to shaping
processes and values. In both cases, senior leadership needs to demonstrate what
it truly values by using the full gamut of its abilities to promote and reward the
desired behaviors.
Rather than trying to jumpstart the process of altering the Directorate’s officebased culture with another round of disruptive changes, the DI would be better
served by continuing to seek improvements at the margins. Some Issue Groups
and Teams have shown that it is possible to achieve an optimal balance between
the attention they pay to current developments and customer service, between
building analysts’ skills and providing timely and valuable responses to
policymakers, and between maintaining their analytic integrity and tailoring
support to meet policymakers’ needs. In short, we know what needs to be done
and how to do it. The challenge is for our senior leadership to show through its
actions that to achieve the most ambitious goals of responsiveness and relevance
across the Directorate it will enforce a high corporate tradecraft standard and
solidify our foundation of analytic and managerial skills through training,
opportunity, and accountability.
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